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Abstract
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names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those 
of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and 
its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent.
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Between 1996 and 2006, Nepal experienced violent civil 
conflict as a consequence of a Maoist insurgency, which 
many argue also brought about an increase in female 
empowerment. This paper exploits variations in exposure 
to conflict by birth cohort, survey date, and district 
to estimate the impact of the insurgency on education 
outcomes. Overall conflict intensity, measured by 
conflict casualties, is associated with an increase in female 
educational attainment, whereas abductions by Maoists, 
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which often targeted school children, have the reverse 
effect. Male schooling tended to increase more rapidly 
in areas where the fighting was more intense, but the 
estimates are smaller in magnitude and more sensitive to 
specification than estimates for females. Similar results are 
obtained across different specifications, and robustness 
checks indicate that these findings are not due to selective 
migration.
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Between 1996 and 2006, Nepal experienced violent civil conflict as a consequence of a Maoist 
insurgency. This paper investigates the impact of being exposed to this insurgency at a young age 
on education outcomes. 
This study makes both an empirical and a methodological contribution to the growing literature 
on the impact of civil conflict on human capital formation. First, this paper extends our 
understanding of the impact of civil conflict on education to include a conflict of moderate 
intensity. With just over 13,000 casualties and less than 1 percent of the population forcibly 
displaced, the level of violence considered in this study was much lower than in conflict episodes 
considered in previous studies.1 Second, two alternative identification strategies are employed to 
increase confidence in the reliability of the estimates: the first relies on variation in conflict 
exposure across birth cohorts and geographic areas in a single survey, as is standard in the literature 
(e.g., Akresh and de Walque 2008; Shemyakina 2011; Chamarbagwala and Morán 2011), and the 
second relies on variation in exposure to conflict among school-aged individuals between household 
surveys and geographic areas. 
Educational attainment is generally expected to be adversely affected by exposure to armed civil 
conflict. Direct youth enrollment in the military, limited mobility, and the destruction of schools 
may all negatively affect the ability of children to attend school. Increased poverty may drive 
parents to remove children from school (to avoid direct costs) and put them to work (to avoid 
opportunity costs). Political instability and reduced life expectancy may decrease expected returns 
to education and, in turn, reduce investments in human capital. Moreover, the schooling of girls is 
often more sensitive to worsening economic conditions than that of boys. A conflict environment 
may also hinder the functioning of education programs by weakening government institutions and 
imposing logistical and staff security challenges on local and international NGOs. 
However, the general expectation that schooling is disrupted in conflict areas may not be well 
founded in the particular case of Nepal. National trends do not indicate an increase in poverty 
coinciding with the conflict but rather a steady decline in poverty (World Bank 2005). Despite 
3 
 
difficulties with public service provision, basic health and education services have been maintained 
(Armon et al. 2004). In addition, the insurgency may have had a positive effect on schooling 
outcomes despite the fighting through both intended and unintended consequences of the Maoist 
presence. The insurgents have been reported to police teacher absenteeism (Hart 2001; see also 
Collins 2006 and Devkota and van Teijlingen 2010, for a similar argument regarding health 
workers) and have explicitly opposed caste- and ethnicity-biased traditions; these actions may have 
directly benefited both male and female education. In addition, the insurgents have publicly 
opposed gender inequality, including gender inequality in access to schooling. For instance, it has 
been reported that “the Maoists have taken a strong stand on this issue – insisting that girls of 
school age attend the local facilities, even to the point of holding parents accountable and liable to 
punishment for the non-attendance of their daughters” (Hart 2001, p. 32). Although the egalitarian 
rhetoric has not been followed completely in practice, a number of women were directly involved in 
combat, and there is anecdotal evidence of improved conditions for women in areas controlled by 
the Maoists, such as decreases in polygamy, domestic violence, and alcoholism (Lama-Tamang et 
al. 2003; Manchanda 2004; Geiser 2005; Aguirre and Pietropaoli 2008; Ariño 2008). The diffusion 
of the egalitarian Maoist ideology may also have increased the aspirations of young girls for their 
own education and the aspirations of parents for their daughters’ education. One unintended aspect 
of the insurgency may have contributed to improving schooling outcomes, especially for girls: 
female labor force participation increased (Menon and Rodgers 2011), and there is evidence that 
when women have more control over household expenditure investments in children increase, 
especially for girls (e.g., Thomas 1990; Duflo 2003). Thus, in the case of Nepal, contrary to most 
episodes of violent conflict, the direction of the effect of the Maoist insurgency on schooling 
outcomes seems unclear a priori. 
Nonetheless, one particular aspect of the Nepalese conflict is likely to have been unambiguously 
detrimental to education: the common insurgent practice of abducting civilians. Parents may have 
been deterred from sending their children to school out of fear that they would be abducted by the 
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insurgents (Human Rights Watch 2004). Quoting figures from the Informal Sector Service Center 
(INSEC), UNESCO (2010) reports that between 2002 and 2006, the Maoists abducted 10,621 
teachers and 21,998 students (p.8). According to additional data provided by INSEC, the total 
number of abductions by Maoist forces during the conflict amounted to more than 85,000. Although 
most abductees were seemingly returned unharmed after a few days of intensive indoctrination 
(Becker 2009; Macours 2011), a number of youths joined the Maoist fighters (in 2003, an estimated 
30 percent of Maoist forces were aged 14–18 years). The indoctrination sessions held during 
abductions are likely to have played a part in their recruitment. 
In this paper, I exploit differences in the intensity of violence experienced by individuals born at 
different times, surveyed at different times, and in different districts to shed light on the ways in 
which experiencing the insurgency at a young age affected educational outcomes. 
Individual data from the 2001 and 2006 Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) of Nepal are 
merged with detailed conflict data collected by INSEC, namely, the number of conflict fatalities, 
school destructions, and abductions by Maoists at the district level. 
I find that overall conflict intensity, as measured by conflict casualties, was associated with an 
increase in female educational attainment, whereas abductions by Maoists, which often targeted 
school children, had the reverse effect. Male schooling also tended to increase more rapidly in areas 
where the fighting was more intense, but the estimates are smaller in magnitude and more sensitive 
to specification. Similar results are obtained across different identification strategies, and robustness 
checks indicate that these findings are not due to selective migration. 
In the next section, I review the existing evidence on the impact of armed conflict on education 
outside Nepal with an emphasis on male-female differences. I then present the Nepalese conflict in 
section II, the data in section III, the empirical strategy in section IV, and the estimation results in 
section V. Section VI concludes. 
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I. <<A>>Literature Review 
A number of cross-country analyses suggest that political instability has large negative effects 
on growth but that recovery to equilibrium levels tends to be rapid (see Blattman and Miguel 2010, 
for a review). At the microeconomic level, the results of an emerging body of literature on the 
impact of war-related destruction or civil conflict on educational attainment show that violent 
conflict often leads to worse educational outcomes, but estimates vary substantially by conflict, 
gender, and educational level. Overall, girls in postprimary education appear to experience the 
worst effects. 
In war-torn Germany and Austria, school-aged individuals exposed to war received fewer years 
of education (Ichino and Winter-Ebmer 2004; Akbulut-Yuksel 2009). In Guatemala, where the 
worst period of the Guatemalan civil war saw nearly 200,000 deaths, Chamarbagwala and Morán 
(2011) find that individuals who were of schooling age in departments that were more affected by 
the war completed fewer years of schooling and that this effect was much more marked for girls. In 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Swee (2009) estimates that cohorts of children exposed to greater conflict 
intensity at the municipal level were less likely to complete secondary schooling, but primary 
schooling attainment was unaffected. Shemyakina (2011a) finds that girls (but not boys) who were 
of schooling age during the Tajik civil war were less likely to complete mandatory schooling in 
areas severely affected by conflict events. Rodriguez and Sanchez (2009) find that in Colombia, 
children aged 12 years and older who were exposed to more violence at the municipal level were 
more likely to drop out of school and enter the labor market. León (2012) finds that individuals who 
were born and raised in Peruvian districts that were more affected by conflict-related violence 
completed fewer years of education. Three recent papers, one by Akresh and de Walque (2008) and 
two by Annan, Blattman, and colleagues (Annan et al. 2009; Blattman and Annan 2010), illustrate 
the marked heterogeneity in findings on the impact of civil conflict across demographic groups and 
across conflicts. Akresh and de Walque (2008) estimate that cohorts of children exposed to the 
extremely violent Rwandan genocide, which killed 10 percent of the country’s population, 
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completed 18.3 percent fewer years of education. However, contrary to results from Guatemala, for 
example (Chamarbagwala and Morán 2011), they find that due to the nature of the conflict, 
nonpoor, male individuals were more negatively affected. Studying the effect of forced recruitment 
into the Ugandan Lord’s Liberation Army, Annan et al. (2009) and Blattman and Annan (2010) find 
dramatically different effects for men and for women in the opposite direction of those obtained by, 
for example, Shemyakina (2011a) and Chamarbagwala and Morán (2011). The abducted men in 
their sample, who were abducted, on average, for just over 15 months, experienced much worse 
educational attainment and labor market outcomes as well as poorer psychological health (Blattman 
and Annan 2010). However, these authors find no such effects for female abductees, which they 
attribute to the lack of opportunities for women in general (Annan et al. 2009). 
 
II. <<A>>Conflict in Nepal 
Nepal was an absolute monarchy until 1990. Despite multiparty democratic elections in 1991, a 
Maoist insurgency broke out in February 1996 in the Rolpa district and ended in 2006. The 
insurgency was initially concentrated in a few Communist strongholds in Western Nepal, but by the 
end of the war, conflict-related casualties were recorded in 73 of the 75 Nepalese districts. The 
Maoist presence varied from sporadic attacks to the organization of local governments and law 
courts. Over the course of the conflict, Maoists attacked government targets, such as army barracks, 
police posts, and local government buildings (Do and Iyer 2010). They were also reported to 
terrorize, loot, abduct, and physically assault civilians (Bohara et al. 2006). However, government 
security forces also killed civilians and were accused of using children for spying, torturing, 
displacing, and summarily convicting civilians (Bohara et al. 2006). 
The principal objective of the insurgents was the creation of a constituent assembly to draft a 
new constitution. Other important stated aims were land redistribution and equality for all castes, 
language groups, and women. 
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A crucial moment in the conflict was the Maoists’ abandonment of a short-lived cease fire in 
November 2001. From that point, the government’s response intensified dramatically, involving the 
Royal Nepal Army and leading to an escalation of violence (see figure S1 in the supplemental 
appendix, available at http://wber.oxfordjournals.org/). Building on opposition to King Gyanendra’s 
authoritative reaction to the prolonged conflict, the Maoists joined forces with some of the 
country’s major political parties, leading to the signing of a peace agreement in November 2006 and 
the creation of an interim government led by a power-sharing coalition that included the Maoists. 
The intensity of conflict varied substantially across the districts of Nepal, as illustrated in figure 
1, which depicts the distribution of districts between the three terciles of conflict deaths per 1,000 
inhabitants. One specific characteristic of the Nepalese conflict that is likely to be particularly 
relevant for an analysis of educational outcomes is the insurgents’ practice of abducting civilians, 
particularly school children, en masse for short periods of intensive indoctrination. As illustrated by 
figure S2, there is a positive correlation between the number of abductions by Maoists and the 
intensity of fighting as measured by conflict-related casualties, but the relationship is not 
systematic. Hence, it is possible to consider the effect of abductions over and above that of overall 
conflict intensity.2 Districts with the highest proportion of abductees among the population are 
found in the middle tercile, which may be due to a lesser need for indoctrination in Maoist 
strongholds.3 Districts in the top quartile of the distribution of abductions per 1,000 inhabitants that 
are not also in the top quartile of the distribution of casualties per 1,000 inhabitants tend to be found 
at the far western or eastern borders, close to districts characterized by intense fighting (i.e., 
numerous casualties). 
Several arguments have been advanced to explain the district variation in the intensity of the 
insurgency, including geography (Murshed and Gates 2005; Bohara et al. 2006; Do and Iyer 2010), 
poverty (Murshed and Gates 2004; Do and Iyer 2010), a lack of political participation (Bohara et al. 
2006), and intergroup inequality (Murshed and Gates 2005; Macours 2011). Determinants of district 
conflict intensity are therefore likely to be correlated with the explained variables of interest, which 
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could give rise to omitted variable bias. As long as the omitted variables in question are constant 
over time, the inclusion of district fixed effects will suffice to remove any bias. If there are time-
varying omitted variables correlated with both conflict intensity and the explained variables of 
interest, the inclusion of district fixed effects will not remove all potential biases, and additional 
steps must be taken to shed light on the causal impact of the insurgency. In section IV, I test for the 
presence of such time-varying omitted variables and discuss how I address potential threats to 
identification. 
Despite the civil conflict, Nepal has experienced steady growth in real gross GDP (5 percent per 
year between 1995/96 and 2003/04), an additional increase in disposable income due to substantial 
flows of remittances from abroad (representing 12.4 percent of the GDP), a steady decrease in 
poverty over the period (from 42 percent in 1995/96 to 31 percent in 2003/04), and an improvement 
in human development indicators, such as primary school enrollment (up from 57 percent to 73 
percent) and child mortality, which decreased by 5 percent per year (World Bank 2005; Macours 
2011). 
However, the positive outlook for Nepal as a whole may mask unequal progress due to 
heterogeneous conflict intensity across districts. Indeed, national trends may hide a slower decrease 
in poverty, or even an increase in poverty, in more conflict-affected areas. In this paper, I exploit 
variation in the intensity of exposure to violent conflict by birth cohort, survey year, and district to 
investigate differential changes in primary educational attainment and completed years of education 
across districts that experienced varying degrees of violence. 
 
III. <<A>>Data  
DHS have been conducted in a number of developing countries as part of the Measure DHS 
project, a reputable USAID-funded project. The second and third DHS in Nepal were conducted in 
2001 and 2006, respectively, and are nationally representative repeated cross-sections. The timing 
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of these surveys is particularly useful because the surveys either preceded or followed the bulk of 
the fighting.4 
For each DHS, a household survey collected the usual individual demographic and education 
data as well as household-level socioeconomic information. More detailed information was then 
collected from all women and a subset of men of reproductive age (if ever married, in the case of 
the 2001 survey). The data used in this analysis come from the household survey as well as 
migration information from the detailed interviews with women in the 2006 DHS.5 
Summary statistics by district conflict intensity and specification subsample can be found in 
table S1. 
The data used to measure conflict intensity are taken from electronic files provided by INSEC, 
an independent, well-regarded human rights NGO based in Kathmandu with reporters in each of the 
75 Nepalese districts who monitor human rights violations. The INSEC data files contain the 
number of conflict-related deaths per month per district of Nepal between February 1996 and 
December 2006 as well as the total number of school destructions and abductions by Maoists at the 
district level, which are used to construct most measures of exposure to conflict used in this paper. 
Data from INSEC have been extensively used in the media, international agencies, and government 
reports and in a number of academic studies, including those by Bohara et al. (2006) and Do and 
Iyer (2010). However, conflict deaths and school destructions are easier to monitor than abductions, 
and there are some surprising figures in the abduction data provided by INSEC, such as only 284 
abductions by Maoists in Rolpa during the entire conflict. A degree of measurement error is likely 
to affect any conflict event data. If uncorrelated with the actual number of conflict events, this 
classical measurement error would lead to attenuation bias. However, the measurement error would 
have to be both inversely related to the true number of conflict events and very severe for it to lead 
to a reversal of the sign of the estimated effect of conflict. Such a result appears implausible given 
the degree of consensus on INSEC conflict data. Furthermore, findings using the number of 
casualties are consistent with the simple difference-in-difference calculations in table 1, in which 
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the conflict event counts are collapsed into binary indicators. These are more blunt indicators of 
conflict intensity, but they are also less prone to measurement error. 
In addition, this study uses two indicators of Maoist control over a given district by 2003 based 
on classifications reported by Hattlebak (2007). I consider, in turn, two alternative definitions of 
Maoist control. I first categorize as under Maoist control any district that is categorized as such by 
both Maoists and the government (Definition 1). I then apply what Hattlebak (2007) considers a 
more reliable classification, the government classification (Definition 2). 
 
IV. <<A>>Empirical Strategy 
I exploit the fact that surveyed individuals to have been exposed to varying degrees of conflict 
intensity according to their district of residence, year of birth, and whether they were surveyed in 
2001 or in 2006. 
The baseline estimation strategy is similar to that in much of the literature estimating the impact 
of civil conflict on individual outcomes reviewed in section I. The strategy exploits differences in 
exposure to conflict by birth year cohort and district of residence for individuals surveyed at the end 
of the conflict in 2006. 
To check the robustness of the baseline results, I use a second identification strategy in which 
the source of identification is the change in the intensity of conflict within the district between 2001 
and 2006, just before and just after the escalation of the conflict. By 2006, individuals born in 1991 
and 1996, for example, would have been exposed to the same total amount of conflict before or 
during their schooling careers (albeit at different times in their lives). Hence, a comparison of the 
schooling outcomes of individuals born in 1991 and 1996 in the 2006 DHS would not be 
particularly informative. However, individuals born in 1991 who were observed at age 10 years in 
the 2001 survey experienced much less conflict by the time their education data were collected in 
2001 than individuals born in 1996 and observed at age 10 years in the 2006 survey. Therefore, 
comparing their education outcomes at age 10 years is informative.6 This second approach allows 
11 
 
me to use variation in conflict intensity over time that would be discarded in the traditional 
approach. In addition, the second approach provides the opportunity for useful checks of the 
robustness of my findings for potential migration and mortality biases. 
I consider two outcome variables: a binary indicator for primary schooling completion and the 
number of years of education completed. Less than 45 percent (20 percent) of the male (female) 
adult population surveyed in the 2006 Nepal DHS had completed primary education, so primary 
schooling completion is a relevant cutoff in the present context. Given the recent occurrence of the 
conflict, a focus on primary education also has an advantage in that many individuals whose 
primary schooling careers coincided with the conflict period are old enough to have completed their 
primary education; hence, their long-term primary schooling outcomes are observed. Finally, given 
the high prevalence of voluntary migration in Nepal, it is important to test the robustness of my 
findings to migration bias. I do this by comparing the schooling attainment of children under 15 
years of age surveyed in 2001 and 2006 in a given district. This age group is appropriate as long as I 
focus on primary education. As of 2004, 97 percent of Nepali migrants were men aged 15–44 years 
who typically left their wives and children behind (Lokshin and Glinskaya 2009). By focusing on 
children under 15 at the time of the survey, the individual is thus both unlikely to have migrated 
himself and unlikely to have accompanied a migrant parent. The DHS did not collect detailed 
migration data, but it does provide data on the date of arrival at the current location for women of 
reproductive age. Before the age of 15 years, the overwhelming majority of children are still living 
with their mothers; hence, I can further test the robustness of my findings for migration bias by 
restricting the sample to children whose mothers had not migrated since the beginning of the 
conflict. 
 
 
<<B>>Specification 1: Exploiting Differences in Exposure to Conflict between Birth Year 
Cohorts within Districts 
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Similar to previous studies on the impact of conflict on educational attainment, I first use data 
from the postconflict DHS (2006) and exploit variations in exposure to conflict by birth year cohort 
and district. In its simplest form, the estimating equation can be written as follows: 
 
𝐸𝐷𝑈𝐶𝑖𝑗
𝑡  = 𝜹𝒋 +  𝜶𝒕 + 𝛽 𝑇𝑂𝑇𝐶𝑂𝑁𝐹𝑗𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡 , (1) 
 
where 𝐸𝐷𝑈𝐶𝑖𝑗𝑡  is, in turn, a dummy variable equal to one if individual i in district j born in year t 
has completed primary education and zero otherwise or the number of years of education completed 
by this individual; 𝜹𝒋 represents district fixed effects; 𝜶𝒕 represents birth year dummies; and 
𝑇𝑂𝑇𝐶𝑂𝑁𝐹𝑗
𝑡 is the interaction between a dummy equal to one when the individual belongs to the 
treated cohort and the number of conflict casualties (per 1,000 inhabitants) in district j during 1996–
2006. In the baseline regressions, I define the treated cohort as those aged 5 to 9 years at the 
beginning of the conflict in 1996, whereas the control cohort includes individuals aged 16 to 19 
years at the beginning of the conflict. This choice is discussed in the preliminary analysis at the end 
of this section. 
Under the assumption that there is no correlation between the number of district casualties and 
unobserved factors varying with district and birth cohort, β is the causal effect of a one-unit increase 
in 𝑇𝑂𝑇𝐶𝑂𝑁𝐹𝑗𝑡 on the primary completion rate or on the number of years of education completed by 
exposed cohorts. A one-unit increase in 𝑇𝑂𝑇𝐶𝑂𝑁𝐹𝑗𝑡 roughly corresponds to one standard deviation 
in the district-level distribution of casualties (0.98). Another way of appraising the magnitude of β 
is to consider a one-unit increase in 𝑇𝑂𝑇𝐶𝑂𝑁𝐹𝑗𝑡 as a move from the district with the least conflict to 
the 53rd district (out of 75) in order of conflict intensity or from the 53rd district to the 69th district 
in order of conflict intensity—a very large increase in conflict intensity. 
There are five “developmental regions” in Nepal, which are relatively homogeneous in terms of 
their level of development (see figure 1). In equation (1), I implicitly restrict birth cohort effects 
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(𝜶𝒕) to be identical across development regions. To reduce the potential for unobserved cohort-
district varying factors to bias the estimate of the effect of conflict exposure, in the main set of 
results, I report estimates of equation (1R) in which the birth year intercepts are allowed to vary by 
development region (𝜶𝒕𝑹).
7 Here, the effect of conflict is identified by using the difference in 
exposure to conflict by district and birth year cohort, net of birth year trends common to all districts 
within a given development region: 
 
𝐸𝐷𝑈𝐶𝑖𝑗
𝑡  = 𝜹𝒋 +  𝜶𝒕𝑹 + 𝛽 𝑇𝑂𝑇𝐶𝑂𝑁𝐹𝑗𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗.𝑡  (1R) 
 
In addition, I estimate variants of equation (1) in which I add regressors capturing specific 
aspects of the conflict that are likely to have affected schooling outcomes, namely, the number of 
school destructions and abductions by Maoist forces (per 1,000 inhabitants) during the conflict. I 
also consider whether Maoist control over the district had an effect on primary attainment by 
estimating variants of equation (1) in which I replace 𝑇𝑂𝑇𝐶𝑂𝑁𝐹𝑗𝑡 with an indicator variable that 
switches on when the district was under Maoist control at the height of the conflict. 
It would be desirable to control for the socioeconomic status of the household in which an 
individual was raised. However, household characteristics are not included as regressors in this 
specification because these are only observed at the time of the survey in 2006, 10 years after the 
beginning of exposure to conflict, and may therefore be caused by the conflict. In addition, at the 
time of the survey, individuals in the control group were 25–28 years old, and members of the 
treated group were 14–18 years old. Therefore, it is difficult to imagine household characteristics 
that would not depend on the individual’s education level at the time of the survey. In the second 
identification strategy described below, I observe school-aged children in their household; hence, I 
can control for household characteristics. 
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<<B>>Specification 2: Comparison of Outcomes in 2001 and 2006 for a Given Age at 
Interview 
In equation (1), I only use data from the postconflict DHS (2006) and exploit variations in 
exposure to conflict according to birth year cohort and district. However, there is a comparable 
survey for 2001, just before the conflict escalated, which allows me to estimate the impact of the 
conflict using an alternative identification strategy based on variation in conflict exposure by survey 
date and district. The idea is to exploit the fact that a child aged, for example, 10 years in 2001 will 
have experienced much less conflict during his lifetime than another child aged 10 years in 2006 in 
the same district, and the difference in conflict exposure between these two children will also vary 
across districts. Finding results similar to those obtained using the traditional identification strategy 
in equation (1) would bolster confidence in the reliability of my estimates. More specifically, I 
estimate the following: 
 
𝐸𝐷𝑈𝐶𝑖𝑗
𝑠  = 𝜽𝒋 +  𝝀𝒔 + 𝛾 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝐹𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑖𝑗𝑠 + 𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑠 ′𝜑 + 𝜇𝑖𝑗𝑠  
𝑠 = 2001, 2006 
𝐶𝑂𝑁𝐹𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑖𝑗
𝑠 = � 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝐹𝑗𝑦𝑠
𝑦=𝑏𝑖𝑟𝑡ℎ𝑦𝑖
, 
(2) 
 
where 𝐸𝐷𝑈𝐶𝑖𝑗𝑠  is the primary education completion dummy or the number of completed years of 
education of individual i in district j observed in survey year s, 𝜽𝒋 represents district fixed effects, 
𝝀𝒔 is a survey dummy equal to one for DHS 2006 and zero for DHS 2001, 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝐹𝑗𝑦 is the number of 
conflict deaths per 1,000 inhabitants that occurred in district j in year y, and 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝐹𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑖𝑗𝑠  is the 
number of conflict deaths per 1,000 inhabitants in district j that occurred between the individual’s 
birth year and survey year s in which the individual is interviewed, which I calculate from yearly 
district death counts. When 𝐸𝐷𝑈𝐶𝑖𝑗𝑠  is the primary education indicator, the sample comprises 
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children aged 10–18 years, who may have completed primary education at the time of the survey. 
When 𝐸𝐷𝑈𝐶𝑖𝑗𝑠  is the number of years of education completed, the sample comprises children aged 
5–14 years, who are of primary school age at the time of the survey. Under the assumption that 
there is no correlation between the cumulative number of district casualties between 1996 and year 
s and unobserved district-survey-varying factors, 𝛾 is the causal effect of a one-unit increase in 
𝐶𝑂𝑁𝐹𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑖𝑗
𝑠  on the rate of primary schooling completion (the number of years of education 
completed) by the 10- to 18-year-old (5- to 14-year old) group. The magnitude of 𝛾 can be directly 
compared to that of β because both 𝑇𝑂𝑇𝐶𝑂𝑁𝐹𝑗𝑡 and 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝐹𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑖𝑗𝑠  are expressed in district casualties 
per 1,000 inhabitants. 
𝑋𝑖𝑗
𝑠  is a set of controls that contains age at interview dummies and their interaction with the 
survey dummy in all specifications, thus allowing the educational attainment of each age group to 
vary independently between the two surveys.8 These covariates are included to control for potential 
differences in the 2001–2006 change in the district-level age composition of the 10- to 18-year-old 
or 5- to 14-year-old group that, if correlated with conflict intensity, could bias the results. In some 
variants, 𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑠  also includes household characteristics at the time of the survey (rural location and 
education of the household head). These characteristics are only measured at the time of the survey 
and could potentially be caused by past conflict. However, finding similar results when these 
observable household characteristics are included would suggest that potential changes in the 
composition of households due to mortality or migration do not drive my findings. 
To further reduce the potential for unobserved time-varying factors to bias the estimate of the 
effect of conflict exposure, in the main set of results, I report estimates of equation (2R) in which 
the coefficients of the survey dummy, the age at survey intercepts, and their interactions are allowed 
to vary by development region. Here, the effect of conflict exposure is identified using the within-
district change in conflict exposure at age x between 2001 and 2006, net of 2001–2006 changes in 
educational attainment at age x common to all districts in a given development region: 
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𝐸𝐷𝑈𝐶𝑖𝑗
𝑠  = 𝜽𝒋 +  𝝀𝒔𝑹 + 𝛾 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝐹𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑖𝑗𝑠 + 𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑠𝑅 ′𝜑 + 𝜇𝑖𝑗𝑠 . (2R) 
 
This second identification strategy has three important advantages compared to the traditional 
approach based on variation in exposure by birth cohort and district for individuals observed at a 
single point in time. First, it has the advantage of comparing cohorts that are born only five years 
apart but have experienced very different degrees of conflict (i.e., a 10-year-old in 2001 in district j 
was exposed to much less conflict than a 10-year-old in 2006 in district j but was born only five 
years earlier), which reduces concerns regarding potential confounders, including differential 
migration patterns. Second, when the sample is restricted to children aged 14 years and under, the 
concern regarding selection bias due to voluntary migration decreases because most migrants are 
men aged 15–44 years, who typically leave their wives and children behind (Lokshin and Glinskaya 
2009). Third, I can further test the robustness of my findings to migration bias by excluding from 
the sample children surveyed in 2006 whose mothers moved to their current location after 1996.9 
All specifications are estimated using linear district fixed-effects panel data models. All models 
allow for error terms to be correlated in an arbitrary fashion within a district to avoid overrejection 
of the null hypothesis of zero treatment effect due to serial correlation, following Bertrand et al. 
(2004). 
 
<<B>>Preliminary Analysis 
An inspection of the data shows that although the legally mandated age for beginning schooling 
is six years old and there are five years of primary schooling, a sizeable proportion of children are 
enrolled in primary school before age six (70.1 percent at five years) and until age 14 (16.1 percent) 
in the 2006 DHS, with numbers subsequently decreasing sharply (7.9 percent at 15 years and 2.85 
percent at 16 years).10 Therefore, an analysis of the long-term effect of conflict on primary 
schooling completion should consider children aged at least 14 years at the time of the survey, and 
control cohorts should have been at least 15 years at the beginning of the conflict (and preferably 
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slightly older). When estimating variants of equation (1), I therefore define the treated cohort as 
comprising individuals aged five to nine years at the beginning of the conflict in 1996, such that all 
treated cohorts are exposed to the conflict during most of their potential primary schooling careers 
and the youngest exposed cohort is observed at age 14 in the 2006 DHS. In the main regressions, 
the control cohorts include individuals aged 16 to 19 years at the beginning of the conflict—that is, 
individuals who were born too early to have their primary education affected by the conflict but are 
as close, and therefore as comparable, to the treated cohorts as possible. I also provide a robustness 
check in which the control group comprises individuals aged 18–25 years at the start of the conflict. 
In the baseline specification, I exclude cohorts aged 10 to 15 years in 1996 because the treatment 
status of these cohorts is less clear. Many of these individuals could have been enrolled in primary 
schooling during the conflict, but they were not exposed to conflict during most of their primary 
schooling careers (see figures S3a and S3b). 
Panel A of table 1 illustrates the basic identification strategy used in the baseline specification. 
This panel shows the difference in the increase in primary schooling between cohorts exposed (row 
(1)) and not exposed (row (2)) to conflict during their primary schooling careers in districts 
experiencing above-median conflict casualties (columns (1) and (4)) compared to districts 
experiencing below-median conflict casualties (columns (2) and (5)). Women born too early to be 
affected by the conflict during their primary schooling years have a much lower rate of primary 
schooling in high-conflict districts compared to women in low-conflict districts. In contrast, primary 
schooling completion is slightly higher in high-conflict districts compared to low-conflict districts 
among the cohort of women who were entering primary school around the beginning of the conflict, 
resulting in an additional increase in female primary schooling of 19 percentage points between the 
two cohorts in high-conflict areas compared to low-conflict areas. A qualitatively similar but less 
dramatic effect is observed among men. 
To shed light on the direction of the potential biases due to differential preconflict trends, I 
conduct several control or “placebo” experiments in which conflict exposure is artificially assigned 
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to cohorts who were too old to be affected by the conflict. In panel B1, I compare the change in 
primary schooling attainment between cohorts aged 16–19 years and cohorts aged 26–29 years at 
the beginning of the conflict in above-median versus below-median conflict intensity districts. The 
difference-in-difference is negative, and for females, it is statistically significant. This finding 
indicates that rates of primary schooling completion were improving more slowly in areas where 
more conflict occurred in 1996–2006 when comparing cohorts that were potentially enrolled in 
primary school (i.e., aged 5–14 years) in the 1972–1984 period and cohorts that were potentially 
enrolled in the 1982–1994 period. If this trend had continued during the conflict period, the 
estimates presented in this paper would be a lower bound of the true effect of conflict; that is, the 
positive coefficient of the conflict variable would be an overly conservative estimate, especially for 
females. 
The ideal placebo experiment would be based on the actual cohorts involved in the experiment 
of interest in the absence of conflict. Such a test is clearly not feasible. However, it is possible to 
conduct an additional placebo experiment based on cohorts born immediately before the period 
relevant to the experiment of interest to check for differences in trends as close as possible to the 
period of interest. The results of this additional placebo experiment comparing cohorts aged 16–19 
years at the beginning of the conflict with those aged 20–23 years are shown in panel B2. During 
this period immediately preceding the conflict, I cannot reject the hypothesis that the evolution of 
primary schooling was parallel in districts with above- and below-median conflict casualties for 
both males and females. 
In panel C, the experiment is conducted by replacing the below- and above-median casualty 
categories with below- and above-median Maoist abduction categories. The results in panel C show 
that primary schooling has progressed more rapidly in districts with above-median Maoist 
abductions. However, two-thirds of districts classified as high (low) conflict based on the median 
number of casualties are also classified as high (low) conflict based on the median number of 
abductions. Therefore, these simple two-by-two calculations may capture the effect of overall 
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conflict intensity, the effect of Maoist abductions, or both. In the regressions that follow, I 
disentangle the effect of overall conflict intensity and Maoist abductions by including both conflict 
variables. 
Panels D1 and D2 show results for tests that replicate the placebo tests for panels B1 and B2, 
where the definition of high- and low-conflict districts based on above- and below-median conflict 
casualties is replaced with the definition based on above- and below-median district abductions. 
Females experienced similar preconflict primary education trends in high- and low-abduction 
districts. Male cohorts found in high-abduction districts experienced slower progress in preconflict 
primary education relative to low-abduction districts. If the same trends continued for cohorts 
considered in the experiment of interest, then the effect of exposure to Maoist abductions would 
tend to be biased downward for males (i.e., to be more negative) but not for females. On the 
contrary, in the regression analysis, I find that after controlling for district casualties, the education 
of females suffered from Maoist abductions, but that the education of males did not. Therefore, the 
difference in male trends observed in panels D1 and D2 does not drive my conclusions. 
 
V. <<A>>Results 
The preliminary analysis in section IV suggested that primary schooling completion rates tended 
to increase more rapidly during armed conflict in areas that experienced a high intensity of conflict, 
especially for girls. In tables 2 to 4, I present estimates of the impact of exposure to conflict on 
educational outcomes to determine whether this striking conclusion of the preliminary analysis is 
confirmed when using more detailed information on the intensity of conflict, controlling for 
unobserved heterogeneity between individual districts and between regions over time and using 
different identification strategies. 
Table 2 reports findings on the impact of conflict exposure on primary schooling completion. 
The first two columns present estimates of the long-term effect of conflict intensity on primary 
schooling completion using the baseline specification (equation (1R)). The last four columns 
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indicate the robustness of these findings through comparison of the change in primary completion 
rates for the 10- to 18-year-old group for districts with varying degrees of conflict intensification 
between the 2001 and 2006 DHS (equation (2R)). The last two columns include controls for rural 
location and the educational attainment of the household head. 
The results in the first column indicate that areas with more fighting witnessed a larger increase 
in female primary education attainment. Casting this result in terms of the distribution of conflict 
violence, an increase in violence of one standard deviation of the district-level distribution of 
casualties during the conflict (0.98 casualties per 1,000 inhabitants) increases female primary 
schooling attainment by 5.6 percentage points. This is roughly the effect of a move from the 5th to 
the 75th percentile of the district-level conflict distribution of total casualties. The sign and order of 
magnitude of this effect is confirmed when comparing cohorts born only five years apart but 
exposed to very different levels of conflict using equation (2R). Across all specifications in table 2, 
conflict exposure does not appear to significantly affect male primary schooling completion, 
although the gender difference in the conflict effect is only statistically significant in columns (3) to 
(6). 
These results are robust to including controls for household characteristics, suggesting that the 
results are not driven by a change in household composition due to, for example, selective mortality 
or migration (columns (5) and (6)). Table S2 presents specifications similar to those in table 2 but 
replaces the indicator for primary schooling completion with years of education completed. Similar 
results are obtained, indicating that an increase in violence of one standard deviation increases 
female educational attainment by 0.6 years. 
Table S3 presents three different specifications to further check the robustness of the 
baseline results in the first two columns of table 2 to the following changes in specification: 
restricting birth year fixed effects to be identical across the five development regions of Nepal, 
changing the control cohort, and replacing the number of casualties with its natural logarithm. The 
results in table S3 confirm that primary education progressed more rapidly during the conflict in 
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districts experiencing more casualties and that this effect was more robust across specifications for 
females. 
Next, I investigate whether specific aspects of the conflict had different effects on primary 
schooling completion (table 3). First, I use INSEC data on the total number of school destructions 
per district to test whether these destructions had a negative effect on primary schooling completion 
despite the overall positive impact of the insurgency (columns (1) and (2)). For both genders, I find 
a statistically insignificant effect, which is likely because a district-level analysis lacks the power to 
identify the effect of school destructions. School destructions were a rare and isolated aspect of the 
conflict11 that could be expected to have had a large effect on schooling at a disaggregated level but 
not at the district level. Second, I use INSEC data on the total number of abductions by Maoists per 
district to test whether a larger number of abductions, often targeting school children, had an 
adverse effect on schooling. The results in columns (3) and (4) indicate that abductions had a 
negative effect on female primary schooling. An increase in the number of abductions (per 1,000 
inhabitants) by one standard deviation of the district-level distribution (16.82) decreases female 
primary schooling attainment by 3.7 percentage points. In other words, the effect of a move from 
the 5th to the 75th percentile of the district-level distribution of total abductions yields a 1.6 
percentage point decline in female primary completion. Third, I test whether primary schooling 
completion improved more in districts controlled by Maoists where the insurgents were better able 
to affect schooling provision according to their ideology (columns (5) to (8)). There is no clear-cut 
definition of insurgent control, with discrepancies between the classifications used by the People’s 
Army and the government (Hatlebakk 2007). Therefore, I use two alternative classifications. The 
choice of definition affects the magnitude and significance of estimates, but the overall message is 
that primary schooling has tended to become more prevalent over time for both genders in areas 
controlled by the Maoists. 
Tables S4 and S5 replicate the analysis in table 3 with birth year fixed effects restricted to be 
identical across development regions of Nepal (tables S4 and S5) and the control cohort replaced 
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with individuals aged 18–24 years at the beginning of the conflict (table S5). The same conclusions 
apply as those drawn from the set of preferred results in table 3. 
In table 4, I turn to the estimated effect of an increase in conflict intensity between 2001 and 
2006 on completed years of education of children of primary schooling age (5–14 years) at the time 
they were surveyed (as per equation (2R)). 
Column (1) of table 4 indicates that an increase in casualties since birth by one standard 
deviation increases the completed years of education by just over one-quarter of a year for girls 
aged 5 to 14 years in 2006 compared to girls from the same district who were the same age when 
surveyed in 2001, before the conflict escalated. For boys, the coefficient of interest is less than half 
the magnitude of that for girls and is significantly different from the estimated conflict effect for 
girls (at the 10 percent significance level). The estimates are very similar when restricting the 2006 
sample to children whose mothers had not moved since 1996 (columns (3) and (4)), which confirms 
that changes in composition due to migration patterns are not driving these findings. In table S6, I 
repeat the analysis in table 4 but restrict the age intercepts and survey year dummy to be identical 
across Nepal’s development regions. The results for the female sample are almost identical, but 
estimates for the male sample are now nearly as large as those for the female sample and are 
statistically significant. Echoing the findings for primary schooling completion, overall, these 
results confirm that primary education progressed more rapidly during the conflict in districts that 
experienced more casualties, and this effect is more robust across specifications for females. 
In conclusion, the results presented in this section provide no support for the hypothesis that the 
Nepalese civil conflict had a negative effect on schooling overall. There is a robust positive effect 
of the intensity of the insurgency on female educational attainment, but there is less of an effect for 
male educational attainment. There is also evidence of a decrease in female primary schooling 
completion where insurgents were more prone to abductions, holding overall conflict intensity 
constant. 
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VI. <<A>>Concluding Remarks 
Despite experiencing a substantial civil conflict between 1996 and 2006, Nepal has surprisingly 
enjoyed one of the best periods in its history in terms of economic growth and poverty reduction. At 
present, however, little is known about whether this period of development at the aggregate level 
hides disparities at a more disaggregated level due to the wide variation in conflict intensity across 
the country. 
In this paper, I exploit variation in exposure to conflict by birth cohort, survey date, and district 
to estimate the impact of conflict intensity on schooling outcomes. 
I find no support for the hypothesis that civil-conflict-related violence, as measured by the 
number of conflict casualties, had a negative effect on the quantity of schooling attained by children 
of either gender. On the contrary, there is robust evidence that female primary schooling attainment 
increased in districts that experienced more conflict deaths relative to districts with fewer conflict 
deaths. This result holds irrespective of whether one compares (within a given district) (i) the 
completion of primary education for cohorts exposed and not exposed to the conflict and observed 
at the end of the conflict or (ii) years of education completed by a given age for cohorts observed 
before (2001) and after (2006) a sharp escalation of the conflict and that were therefore exposed to 
very different degrees of conflict. It is also robust to a number of changes in specifications. In 
particular, robustness checks indicate that changes in household composition due to conflict-
induced migration patterns do not drive this finding. 
However, one aspect of the Nepalese civil conflict that is particularly relevant to schooling 
outcomes had adverse consequences on female primary schooling: the widespread insurgent 
practice of abducting civilians, many of whom were school children.  
The findings reported in this paper echo the positive changes observed for Nepal as a whole 
during the conflict period in terms of economic growth, education, and child health. The present 
analysis shows that the progress in education observed at the country level does not hide a slower 
increase in districts where more fighting occurred, but the insurgent practice of abducting civilians 
24 
 
adversely affected female educational outcomes. The estimates presented in this paper are in line 
with the existing qualitative literature on the Nepalese civil conflict, which consistently reports 
mixed conclusions with respect to the impact of the conflict on education and female empowerment 
(e.g., Hart 2001; Lama-Tamang 2003; Manchanda 2004; Pettigrew and Schneiderman 2004; Geiser 
2005; Aguirre and Pietropaoli 2008; Ariño 2008; Falch 2010). 
Education, particularly female educational attainment, appears to have benefited from the 
societal changes induced directly or indirectly by the insurgency more than it was adversely 
affected by the loss of income and other disruptions caused by the conflict. Data limitations prevent 
a more detailed analysis of the channels through which the conflict affected education beyond the 
distinction between the effect of conflict as a whole and that of abductions. However, potential 
mechanisms suggested by the existing anthropological and peace studies literature include Maoist 
efforts to remove barriers to schooling for all children from the lower castes and to reduce teacher 
absenteeism (e.g., Hart 2001; Lama-Tamang 2003), which could have benefited both male and 
female education; the Maoist influence in encouraging or coercing parents to send girls to school 
(Hart 2001); and the Maoists’ effect on female empowerment. Although the exact figure is 
contested, a substantial share of the guerillas in the Maoist ranks was female. Many more females 
were involved in the Maoist movement without direct participation in combat, such as by 
disseminating propaganda (Lama-Tamang et al. 2003; Pettigrew and Schneiderman 2004), and even 
larger numbers may have been influenced by the Maoist discourse on gender equality. In addition, 
there is anecdotal evidence of an improvement in the condition of women in areas controlled by the 
Maoists, such as decreases in polygamy, domestic violence, and alcoholism, as well as greater 
support for women to divorce their husbands (Lama-Tamang et al. 2003; Manchanda 2004; Geiser 
2005; Ariño 2008). Although the insurgents’ rhetoric was often in contrast with their actual practice 
(Pettigrew and Schneiderman 2004), the presence of females in their ranks and the propaganda 
promoting female autonomy may have increased female bargaining power within the household as 
well as female aspirations. According to Hart (2001), “girls and women are strongly encouraged to 
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gain an education and to participate in society generally and in activities connected to the ‘People’s 
War’ in particular. This directly challenges their traditional role and apparently stimulates girls to 
consider leading lives beyond marriage and the home (Hart 2001, p.35)”. Furthermore, an 
unintended consequence of the conflict has been that women have adopted roles typically reserved 
for men. Women’s involvement in the labor market increased as a consequence (Menon and 
Rodgers 2011). The rise in female labor market participation may have increased returns to female 
schooling and motivated girls to obtain more education and parents to invest more in their 
daughters’ education. Increased female earnings are also likely to improve the ability of mothers to 
influence the way household resources are spent. Moreover, there is evidence that when women 
have more control over household expenditures, such as because their own earnings make up a 
larger share of the household’s income, investments in children increase; this is especially the case 
for girls (e.g., Thomas 1990; Duflo 2003), although this may not be the case in all contexts 
(Quisumbing and Maluccio 2003; Gitter and Barham 2008). Finally, the nature of the occupations 
of women outside the home also changed. In many areas, women were reported to take on 
leadership roles in local institutions, including schools (Pettigrew and Schneiderman 2004). This 
improvement in female representation in local institutions may have contributed to increased 
education, especially for girls. 
Data limitations prevent rigorous tests of the role played by these different potential channels in 
explaining the finding that education, particularly female education, increased more in areas where 
the fighting was more intense.12 Future research aiming to disentangle the role of each of the 
channels through which the insurgency may have improved educational outcomes would be 
valuable. 
An issue beyond the scope of this paper is the important question of the effect of civil conflict 
on the quality of education, which is potentially large (for a review, see Shemyakina and Valente 
2011). Data limitations have thus far precluded quantitative research on the impact of conflict on 
the quality of schooling, but there is growing evidence that cognitive skills, rather than completed 
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years of education, matter for individual earnings and economic growth (e.g., Hanushek and 
Woessmann 2008). Therefore, even where the number of years of education completed is not 
adversely affected by civil conflict, such conflict may have deleterious effects on human capital if 
the quality of learning deteriorates. 
From an international perspective, this paper contributes to unpacking the complexity that lies 
behind the generic term civil conflict. The idiosyncrasies of each conflict highlight the need for 
additional research on the impacts of different conflicts to shed light on the range of potential 
effects rather than a focus on extreme, but thankfully rare, instances. 
From a policy perspective, the present findings call for measures that aim to protect school 
children and teachers from being directly targeted by combatants. As shown in this paper, even 
where primary education systems appear very resilient to surrounding violence, direct targeting of 
schools, however mild (e.g., brief abductions of pupils and teachers for indoctrination purposes), 
has adverse effects on schooling, especially for girls. 
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1 The estimated number of individuals forcibly displaced in Nepal is approximately 200,000 
(USAID, 2007). Studies reviewed in this paper have considered the impact of conflict on education 
in Tajikistan (between 50,000 and 100,000 deaths and 10 percent of the country’s population 
internally displaced in the two worst years of conflict, Shemyakina, 2011b), Guatemala (200,000 
deaths during the worst conflict period, Chamarbagwala and Morán, 2011), Rwanda (nearly 10 
percent of the population killed, Akresh and de Walque, 2008), and Peru (just under 70,000 deaths, 
León 2012). 
2 The correlation coefficient between total conflict deaths and abductions per 1,000 inhabitants is 
0.14. 
3 Hutt (2005) also links abductions to the weakness of support for the Maoists: “The Maoists know 
that much of their support is hollow and based on fear. Maoist cadres have taken to mounting 
temporary abductions of large numbers of school teachers and students, who are taken to remote 
locations and subjected to political indoctrination sessions” (Hutt, 2005, p.86). 
4 In 2001, six out of 257 sampling units had to be dropped from the sample for security reasons 
(Ministry of Health et al., 2002, p.6). 
5 In the 2001 survey, children listed on the household roster cannot be matched to their mothers. 
6 The variation in exposure between surveys also varies substantially between districts. For 
instance, in Mahottari, there were 0.14 additional deaths per 1,000 inhabitants between the two 
DHS, whereas in Jumla, there were close to three additional deaths per 1,000 inhabitants during the 
same period. 
7 Note that region dummies are subsumed under the district fixed effects, but the interactions 
between regions and birth year dummies are not. 
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8 When estimating equation (2) without any of the controls included,  is positive and statistically 
significant for both females and males in the completed years of education regression and positive 
and statistically significant for females only in the primary education completion regression (full 
results are available upon request). 
9 The education data used in this paper come from the DHS household datasets. Information on date 
of arrival at the present location was only collected in individual interviews with women aged 15–
49 years. The same exclusion could not be implemented for the 2001 DHS because individuals 
listed on the household roster cannot be matched to their mothers.  
10 In the 2001 DHS, 44.4 percent of five-year-olds, 24.6 percent of 14-year-olds, and 13.6 percent of 
15-year-olds were enrolled in primary schooling. 
11 According to the data provided by INSEC, 76 schools were destroyed. 
12 See the appendix for some insights based on self-reported measures of female empowerment 
available in the DHS. 
29 
 
REFERENCES 
Aguirre, Daniel, and Irene Pietropaoli. 2008. “Gender Equality, Development and Transitional 
Justice: The Case of Nepal.” The International Journal of Transitional Justice 2: 356-377. 
Akbulut-Yuksel, Mevlude 2009. “Children of war: the long-run effects of large-scale physical 
destruction and warfare on children.” IZA Working Paper No.4407. IZA, Bonn. 
Akresh, Richard, and Damien de Walque. 2008. "Armed Conflict and Schooling: Evidence from the 
1994 Rwandan Genocide.” World Bank Policy Research Paper No.4606. World Bank, 
Washington. 
Annan, Jeannie, Chris Blattman, Dyan Mazurana, and Khristopher Carlson. 2009. “Women and 
Girls at War: ‘Wives’.” Mothers, and Fighters in the Lord’s Resistance Army, HICN 
Working paper 63.  
Ariño, Maria Villellas. 2008. “Nepal: A Gender View of the Armed Conflict and Peace Process.” 
Quaderns de Construcció de Pau No.4, Escola de Cultura de Pau, Barcelona. 
Armon, Jeremy, Chris Berry, Debi Duncan, Rebecca Calder, Susan Clapham, and Mark Harvey. 
2004. “Service Delivery in Difficult Environments: the case of Nepal.” DFID, Policy 
Division, Asia Policy Division, Nepal Country Office. 
Becker, Jo. 2009. “Child Recruitment in Burma, Sri Lanka, and Nepal.” In Child Soldiers in the Age 
of Fractured States, eds. S. Gates and S. Reich, 108–120. University of Pittsburg Press, 
Pittsburg. 
Bertrand, Marianne, Esther Duflo, and Sendhil Mullainathan. 2004. “How Much Should We Trust 
Differences-in-Differences Estimates?” Quarterly Journal of Economics 1191: 249–275. 
Blattman, Chris, and Jeannie Annan. 2010. “The Consequences of Child Soldiering.” Review of 
Economics and Statistics 92 (4): 882–898. 
Blattman, Chris, and Edward Miguel. 2010. “Civil War.” Journal of Economic Literature 48 (1): 3–
57. 
30 
 
Bohara, Alok, Neil Mitchell, and Mani Nepal. 2006. “Opportunity, Democracy, and the Exchange 
of Political Violence: A Subnational Analysis of Conflict in Nepal.” Journal of Conflict 
Resolution 50 (1): 108–128. 
Central Bureau of Statistics [Nepal]. 2009. Nepal Statistical Yearbook 2009. 
http://www.cbs.gov.np/Year_Book_2009/images/Final_Chapters/chapter1/1.3.pdf. 
Chamarbagwala, Rubiana, and Hilcías E. Morán. 2011. “The Human Capital Consequences of Civil 
War: Evidence from Guatemala.” Journal of Development Economics 94: 41–61. 
Collins Sophia. 2006. “Assessing the Health Implications of Nepal's Ceasefire.” Lancet 368: 907–
908. 
Devkota, Bhimsen, and Edwin R. van Teijlingen. 2010. “Understand Effects of Armed Conflict on 
Health Outcomes: The case of Nepal.” Conflict and Health 4: 20. 
Do, Quy-Toan, and Lakshmi Iyer. 2010. “Geography, Poverty and Conflict in Nepal.” Journal of 
Peace Research 47 (6): 735–748. 
Duflo, Esther 2003. “Grandmothers and Granddaughters: Old-Age Pensions and Intrahousehold 
Allocation in South Africa.” World Bank Economic Review 17 (1): 1–25. 
Falch, Ashild. 2010. “Women’s Political Participation and Influence in Post-Conflict Burundi and 
Nepal.” Peace Research Institute Oslo Working Paper, Oslo. 
Geiser, Alexandra. 2005. “Social exclusion and conflict transformation in Nepal: women, Dalit and 
ethnic groups.” Working Paper 5/2005, Swisspeace, Bern. 
Gitter, Seth R., and Bradford L. Barham. 2008. “Women's Power, Conditional Cash Transfers, and 
Schooling in Nicaragua.” World Bank Economic Review 22 (2): 271–290. 
Hanushek, Eric A., and Ludger Woessmann. 2008. “The Role of Cognitive Skills in Economic 
Development.” Journal of Economic Literature 46: 607–668. 
Hart, Jason. 2001. “Conflict in Nepal and its Impact on Children.” A Discussion Document 
Prepared for UNICEF Regional Office South Asia, Refugee Studies Centre, Oxford. 
31 
 
Hatlebakk, Magnus. 2007. “LSMS Data Quality in Maoist Influenced Areas of Nepal.” No 6, CMI 
Working Papers, CMI (Chr. Michelsen Institute), Bergen. 
Human Rights Watch. 2004. “Between a Rock and a Hard Place: Civilians Struggle to Survive in 
Nepal’s Civil War.” http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2004/10/06/between-rock-and-hard-
place?print, accessed 10th Feb 2011. 
Hutt, Michael. 2004. “Nepal and Bhutan in 2004: Two Kings, Two Futures.” Asian Survey 45 (1): 
83–87. 
Ichino, Andrea, and Rudolf Winter-Ebmer. 2004. “The Long-Run Educational Cost of World War 
II.” Journal of Labor Economics 22 (1): 57–86. 
INSEC. 2009. Electronic data files. Informal Sector Service, Kathmandu. 
Lama-Tamang, Mukta S., Sumitra M. Gurung, Dharma Swarnakar, and Sita Rana Magar. 2003. 
“Social Change in Conflict Areas: Assessment Report.” Prepared for UK Department for 
International Development (DFID) Nepal. Kathmandu. 
León, Gianmarco. 2012. “Civil Conflict and Human Capital Accumulation: The Long-Term Effects 
of Political Violence in Perú.” Journal of Human Resources 47 (4): 992–1022. 
Lokshin, Michael M., and Elena Glinskaya. 2009. “The Effect of Male Migration on Employment 
Patterns of Women in Nepal.” World Bank Economic Review 23 (3): 481–507. 
Macours, Karen. 2011. Increasing Inequality and Civil Conflict in Nepal.” Oxford Economic Papers 
63 (1): 1–26 
Manchanda, Rita. 2004. “Maoist Insurgency in Nepal. Radicalizing Gendered Narratives.” Cultural 
Dynamics 162 (3): 237–258. 
Menon, Nidhiya, and Yana Rodgers. 2011. “War and Women’s Work: Evidence from the Conflict 
in Nepal.” World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 5745, World Bank, 
Washington. 
32 
 
Ministry of Health [Nepal], New ERA, and ORC Macro. 2002. Nepal Demographic and Health 
Survey 2001. Calverton, Maryland, USA: Family Health Division, Ministry of Health; New 
ERA; and ORC Macro. 
Murshed, S. Mansoob, and Scott Gates. 2005. “Spatial-Horizontal Inequality and the Maoist 
Insurgency in Nepal.” Review of Development Economics 9(1): 121–134. 
Pettigrew, Judith, and Sara Schneiderman. 2004. “Women and the Maobaadi: Ideology and Agency 
in Nepal’s Maoist Movement.” Himal South Asia 17 (1): 19–29. 
Quisumbing, Agnes R., and John A. Maluccio. 2003. “Resources at Marriage and Intrahousehold 
Allocation: Evidence from Bangladesh, Ethiopia, Indonesia, and South Africa.” Oxford 
Bulletin of Economics and Statistics 65: 283–327. 
Rodríguez, Catherine, and Fabio Sánchez. 2009. “Armed Conflict Exposure, Human Capital 
Investments and Child Labor: Evidence from Colombia.” HiCN Working Paper No. 68. 
Shemyakina, Olga 2011a. “The Effect of Armed Conflict on Accumulation of Schooling: Results 
from Tajikistan.” Journal of Development Economics 95 (2): 186–200. 
Shemyakina, Olga 2011b. “Labor Market, Education and Armed Conflict in Tajikistan.” World 
Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 5738, World Bank, Washington. 
Shemyakina, Olga, and Christine Valente. 2011. “Education and Violent Conflict in South Asia: 
Challenges and Solutions.” Background paper prepared for the World Bank Regional Study 
on “Improving the Quality of Learning in South Asia.” Mimeograph, University of Bristol, 
Bristol. 
Swee, Eik Leong. 2009. “On War and Schooling Attainment: The Case of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina.” HiCN Working Paper No. 57. 
Thomas, Duncan. 1990. “Intra-Household Resource Allocation: An Inferential Approach.” Journal 
of Human Resources 25 (4): 635–664. 
UNESCO. 2010. Education under Attack. United Nations Educations Scientific and Cultural 
Organization, Paris. 
33 
 
USAID. 2007. Nepal – Humanitarian Assistance Fact Sheet No. 1, June. 
http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNADJ147.pdf. Accessed 5th May 2010. 
Wallensteen, Peter, and Margareta Sollenberg. 2001. “Armed Conflict 1989–2000.” Journal of 
Peace Research 38 (5): 629–644 
World Bank. 2005. “Nepal - Resilience amidst Conflict: An Assessment of Poverty in Nepal, 1995–
96 and 2003–04.” Report No. 34834-NP. World Bank, Washington. 
 
 
 
 
 
34 
 
 
Figure 1. Conflict Intensity across Districts of Nepal. Author’s calculations are based on casualties 
recorded in INSEC (2009) and district population figures from the 1991 population census (Central 
Bureau of Statistics, 2009). District terciles are defined by the distribution of total district casualties 
per 1,000 inhabitants. 
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TABLE 1. Preliminary Difference-in-Difference Calculations, Completion of Primary Schooling  
  Female  Male  
  Primary Education Rate by 
  
Number of 
Casualties in 
District   
Number of 
Casualties in 
District   
  (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6)  
  High Low Difference  High Low Difference  
 Panel A: Binary DiD Experiment      
(1) Age 5 to 9 in 1996 0.67 0.64 0.03  0.80 0.79 0.01  
(2) Age 16 to 19 in 1996 0.27 0.43 −0.16  0.63 0.70 −0.07  
 Difference 0.40 0.21 0.19 *** 0.17 0.09 0.08 * 
    (0.045)    (0.038)  
 Panel B1: Placebo DiD Experiment 1      
(1) Age 16 to 19 in 1996 0.27 0.43 −0.16  0.63 0.70 −0.07  
(2) Age 26 to 29 in 1996 0.13 0.20 −0.07  0.50 0.53 −0.03  
 Difference 0.14 0.23 −0.09 ** 0.13 0.17 −0.04  
    (0.045)    (0.047)  
 Panel B2: Placebo DiD Experiment 2      
(1) Age 16 to 19 in 1996 0.27 0.43 −0.16  0.63 0.70 −0.07  
(2) Age 20 to 23 in 1996 0.15 0.32 −0.17  0.58 0.62 −0.04  
 Difference 0.12 0.11 0.01  0.05- 0.08 −0.03  
    (0.040)    (0.047)  
  
Number of 
Abductions in 
District   
Number of 
Abductions in 
District   
  High Low Difference  High Low Difference  
 Panel C: Binary DiD Experiment      
(1) Age 5 to 9 in 1996 0.70 0.62 0.08  0.82 0.77 0.05  
(2) Age 16 to 19 in 1996 0.33 0.37 −0.04  0.61 0.70 −0.09  
 Difference 0.37 0.25 0.12 ** 0.21 0.07 0.14 *** 
    (0.053)    (.038)  
 Panel D1: Placebo DiD Experiment 1      
(1) Age 16 to 19 in 1996 0.33 0.37 −0.04  0.61 0.70 −0.09  
(2) Age 26 to 29 in 1996 0.15 0.19 −0.04  0.53 0.52 0.01  
 Difference 0.18 0.18 0.00  0.08 0.18 −0.10 ** 
    (0.051)    (0.049)  
 Panel D2: Placebo DiD Experiment 2      
(1) Age 16 to 19 in 1996 0.33 0.37 −0.04  0.61 0.70 −0.09  
(2) Age 20 to 23 in 1996 0.22 0.27 −0.05  0.62 0.59 0.03  
 Difference 0.11 0.10 0.01  −0.01- 0.11 −0.12 *** 
    (0.041)    (0.045)  
Source: INSEC 2009, Central Bureau of Statistics 2009. Education data are based on Nepal DHS 2006. 
Note: District casualties are expressed per 1,000 inhabitants. “High” and “low” refer to above-median or below-median 
district totals per 1,000 inhabitants. Standard errors clustered at the district level are in parentheses. All first differences 
(i.e., row (1) – row (2) for a given conflict category) are statistically significant, except for values marked with -. DiD 
indicates difference-in-difference. 
* p < 0.10  
** p < 0.05  
*** p < 0.01 
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TABLE 2. Impact of Conflict Intensity Measured by Casualties on Primary Schooling Completion 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Explained Variable and 
Sample 
Primary 
Education -
Female 
Primary 
Education - 
Male 
Primary 
Education - 
Female 10–
18 
Primary 
Education - 
Male 10–18 
Primary 
Education - 
Female 10–
18 
Primary 
Education - 
Male 10–18 
Specification Eq. (1R) Eq. (1R) Eq. (2R) Eq. (2R) Eq. (2R) Eq. (2R) 
=1 if 5–9 in 1996 × 
District casualties during 
1996–2006 
(𝑇𝑂𝑇𝐶𝑂𝑁𝐹𝑗
𝑡) 
0.0555** 0.0241     
(0.0272) (0.0251)     
District casualties before 
survey (𝐶𝑂𝑁𝐹𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑖𝑗
𝑠 ) 
  0.0764* 0.0036 0.0811** 0.0094 
  (0.0431) (0.0368) (0.0368) (0.0338) 
=1 if rural     −0.1094*** −0.0622*** 
     (0.0205) (0.0154) 
=1 if head has primary 
education 
    0.0543*** 0.0684*** 
    (0.0133) (0.0115) 
=1 if head has secondary 
education 
    0.2127*** 0.2046*** 
    (0.0120) (0.0139) 
=1 if head has higher 
education 
    0.3249*** 0.2597*** 
    (0.0251) (0.0253) 
Panel variable District District District District District District 
Included dummies:       
Year of birth Yes Yes No No No No 
Region × Year of birth Yes Yes No No No No 
DHS 2006 No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Age at interview No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Region × DHS 2006 No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
DHS 2006 x Age at 
interview No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Region × Age at interview No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
DHS 2006 × Region × Age 
at interview  No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 3,823 3,055 9,595 9,267 9,584 9,255 
No. of clusters 75 75 69a 69a 69a 69a 
R-squared 0.1106 0.0368 0.2077 0.3021 0.2602 0.3372 
p value male vs. femaleb  0.345 0.074 0.044 
Source: INSEC 2009, Central Bureau of Statistics 2009, Nepal DHS 2001, and Nepal DHS 2006. 
Note: All specifications are estimated using the panel fixed-effects estimator and include a constant. District casualties 
are expressed per 1,000 inhabitants. Columns (1) and (2): Sample only includes individuals surveyed in the Nepal DHS 
2006 and aged 5–9 years (treatment group) or 16–19 years (control group) at the beginning of the conflict in 1996. 
Columns (3) to (6): Sample only includes individuals surveyed in Nepal DHS 2001 or 2006 aged 10 to 18 years at the 
time of the survey.  
aDHS data collection was somewhat affected by the conflict in 2001. Hence, contrary to DHS 2006, four districts were 
not covered: Dolpa, Jajarkot, Rolpa, and Rukhum. The small districts of Manang and Mustang were not surveyed, but 
these districts did not experience any casualties during the conflict.  
bp value of an F test of equality between the reported treatment effects for males and females. 
Standard errors clustered at the district level are in parentheses.  
* p < 0.10 
** p < 0.05 
*** p < 0.01 
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TABLE 3. Impact of Alternative Conflict Variables on Primary Schooling Completion 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
School 
Destructions 
Female 
School 
Destructions 
Male 
Maoist 
Abductions 
Female 
Maoist 
Abductions 
Male 
Maoist Control 
Female –
Definition 1 
Maoist Control 
Male –
Definition 1 
Maoist Control 
Female –
Definition 2 
Maoist Control 
Male –  
Definition 2 
Explained Variable Primary Education 
Primary 
Education 
Primary 
Education 
Primary 
Education 
Primary 
Education 
Primary 
Education 
Primary 
Education 
Primary 
Education 
Specification Eq. (1R) Eq. (1 R) Eq. (1 R) Eq. (1R) Eq. (1R) Eq. (1R) Eq. (1R) Eq. (1R) 
=1 if 5–9 in 1996 × District 
casualties during 1996–2006 
(𝑇𝑂𝑇𝐶𝑂𝑁𝐹𝑗
𝑡) 
0.0539* 0.0301 0.0638** 0.0231     
(0.0302) (0.0291) (0.0275) (0.0259)     
=1 if 5–9 in 1996 × District schools 
destroyed 2002–2006 
0.4176 −1.7848       
(3.1298) (2.3395)       
=1 if 5–9 in 1996 × Maoist 
Abductions during 1996–2006 
  −0.0022*** 0.0002     
  (0.0005) (0.0010)     
=1 if 5–9 in 1996 × District 
controlled by Maoists (Definition 1) 
    0.0916 0.2009***   
    (0.0590) (0.0529)   
=1 if 5–9 in 1996 × District 
controlled by Maoists (Definition 2) 
      0.1456*** 0.0923* 
      (0.0457) (0.0506) 
Panel variable District District District District District District District District 
Included dummies:         
Year of birth  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Region × Year of birth  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 3,823 3,055 3,823 3,055 3,823 3,055 3,823 3,055 
No. of clusters 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 
R-squared 0.1106 0.0370 0.1118 0.0368 0.1105 0.0415 0.1130 0.0382 
p value male vs. femalea 0.466 0.0134 0.208 0.456 
Source: INSEC 2009, Central Bureau of Statistics 2009, Nepal DHS 2006, 
Note: All specifications are estimated using the panel fixed-effects estimator and include a constant. School destructions and abductions by Maoists are expressed per 1,000 
inhabitants. Sample only includes individuals surveyed in the Nepal DHS 2006 and aged 5–9 years (treatment group) or 16–19 years (control group) at the beginning of the conflict in 
1996. Definition of a district controlled by Maoists based on matches between People’s Army and government classifications as of 2003 (Definition 1) or government classification 
(Definition 2), according to Hattlebak (2007). ap value of an F test of equality between the reported treatment effects for males and females. Standard errors clustered at the district 
level are in parentheses.  
* p < 0.10,** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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TABLE 4. Impact of Conflict Intensity on Completed Years of Education, 5- to 14-year-olds 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Explained Variable and Sample 
Years of 
Education 
Female 5–14 
Years of 
Education  
Male 5–14 
Years of 
Education 
Female 5–14 – 
Mother here 
since 1996 
Years of 
Education  
Male 5–14 – 
Mother here 
since 1996 
Specification Eq. (2R) Eq. (2R) Eq. (2R) Eq. (2R) 
District casualties before survey 
(𝐶𝑂𝑁𝐹𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑖𝑗
𝑠 ) 
0.2795** 0.1224 0.2633** 0.0755 
(0.1147) (0.1207) (0.1172) (0.1391) 
=1 if rural −0.3916*** −0.1559** −0.4703*** −0.1770** 
 (0.0788) (0.0664) (0.0914) (0.0703) 
=1 if head has primary education 0.2210*** 0.2301*** 0.2051*** 0.2381*** 
(0.0428) (0.0361) (0.0453) (0.0374) 
=1 if head has secondary education 0.8263*** 0.7064*** 0.8619*** 0.7242*** 
(0.0431) (0.0386) (0.0509) (0.0388) 
=1 if head has higher education 1.1291*** 1.0828*** 1.3829*** 1.2016*** 
 (0.1035) (0.0846) (0.1137) (0.1124) 
Panel variable District District District District 
Included dummies:     
DHS 2006 Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Age at interview Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Region × DHS 2006 Yes Yes Yes Yes 
DHS 2006 × Age at interview Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Region × Age at interview Yes Yes Yes Yes 
DHS 2006 × Region × Age at 
interview  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 11,793 12,116 9,772 9,959 
No. of clusters 69a 69a 69a 69a 
R-Squared 0.5062 0.6077 0.4909 0.5996 
p value male vs. femaleb 0.079 0.065 
Source: INSEC 2009, Central Bureau of Statistics 2009, Nepal DHS 2001, and Nepal DHS 2006. 
Note: All specifications are estimated using the panel fixed-effects estimator and include a constant. District casualties 
are expressed per 1,000 inhabitants. Sample only includes individuals surveyed in the Nepal DHS 2001 and 2006 and 
aged 5–14 years at the time of the survey. In columns (3) and (4), the 2006 sample is restricted to individuals whose 
mothers were interviewed individually and whose mothers reported having lived in their current place of residence as 
of 1996. The same exclusion could not be implemented for the 2001 DHS because individuals listed on the household 
roster cannot be matched to their mothers.  
aDHS data collection was somewhat affected by the conflict in 2001. Hence, contrary to DHS 2006, four districts were 
not covered: Dolpa, Jajarkot, Rolpa, and Rukhum. The small districts of Manang and Mustang were not surveyed, but 
these districts did not experience any casualties during the conflict.  
b value of an F test of equality between the reported treatment effects for males and females. 
Standard errors clustered at the district level are in parentheses.  
* p < 0.10 
** p < 0.05 
*** p < 0.01 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 
 
Effect of Conflict Intensity on Self-Reported Measures of Female Empowerment 
The 2001 and 2006 DHS surveys both asked women interviewed individually about who had the 
final say in their household with respect to decisions regarding (i) their own healthcare, (ii) making 
large household purchases, (iii) making household purchases for daily needs, and (iv) visits to 
family or relatives. In addition, women interviewed individually in the 2001 and 2006 DHS who 
reported having worked in the previous 12 months were asked who decided how the money they 
earned was spent. When estimating the effect of conflict intensity on the probability that women 
report being either the sole- or joint decision maker for each of the four items listed above using 
Equation (2), no statistically significant change was observed. However, using the same estimation 
strategy, I find that women became significantly more likely to report control over the way their 
earnings were spent where the conflict intensified more between 2001 and 2006.1 The information 
conveyed by these self-reported measures of female bargaining power in the household is limited, 
and gives mixed support to the idea that women gained more control over household finances 
during the conflict in areas more affected by the insurgency. 
                                                          
1 Results available upon request. 
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Table S1: Summary Statistics 
Conflict Casualties Tercile Low Intensity Medium Intensity High Intensity 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Male Female Male Female Male Female 
Panel A – Sample used to estimate Eq. (1R) in the primary schooling completion analysis (Tables 1-3) 
=1 if primary education 0.769 0.562 0.743 0.545 0.742 0.511 
District casualties per 1000 0.265 0.270 0.647 0.642 1.564 1.549 
during 1996-2006 (0.098) (0.101) (0.160) (0.161) (0.958) (0.972) 
School destructions per 1000  0.003 0.003 0.005 0.005 0.006 0.006 
during 1996-2006 (0.005) (0.005) (0.010) (0.010) (0.008) (0.008) 
Maoist abductions per 1000 1.135 1.301 11.890 11.411 5.131 4.904 
during 1996-2006 (2.515) (2.454) (27.159) (27.138) (5.482) (5.264) 
=1 if district controlled by  
Maoists (Definition 1) 0.042 0.058 0.123 0.129 0.304 0.321 
=1 if district controlled by  
Maoists (Definition 2) 0.102 0.122 0.357 0.337 0.541 0.554 
Age at interview 19.983 20.376 19.020 19.659 18.873 19.928 
 (5.286) (5.327) (5.018) (5.098) (5.032) (5.220) 
=1 if DHS 2006 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Observations 1264 1454 904 1122 887 1247 
Panel B - Sample used to estimate Eq. (2R) in the completed years of education analysis (Table 4) 
Years of education 1.928 1.604 1.925 1.639 1.894 1.620 
 (2.207) (2.148) (2.140) (2.065) (2.150) (2.035) 
District casualties before survey 
per 1000  (𝐶𝑂𝑁𝐹𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑖𝑗
𝑠 ) 
0.133 0.135 0.312 0.321 0.687 0.693 
(0.151) (0.153) (0.327) (0.329) (0.711) (0.697) 
Age at interview 9.289 9.305 9.350 9.353 9.389 9.406 
 (2.792) (2.857) (2.810) (2.801) (2.850) (2.810) 
=1 if DHS 2006 0.463 0.460 0.463 0.475 0.466 0.473 
=1 if rural 0.757 0.767 0.866 0.873 0.845 0.842 
Education of the household head:       
=1 if no education 0.483 0.495 0.529 0.521 0.553 0.560 
=1 if primary education 0.225 0.227 0.262 0.273 0.235 0.233 
=1 if secondary education 0.239 0.223 0.176 0.180 0.178 0.170 
=1 if higher education 0.053 0.055 0.032 0.026 0.034 0.037 
Observations 4714 4449 3808 3852 3594 3492 
Author’s calculations based on DHS 2001 and 2006 and INSEC (2009). District population as of the 1991 Population 
Census based on Central Bureau of Statistics (2009). Standard deviations in parentheses. Definition of district 
controlled by Maoist based either on matches between People’s Army and government classifications as of 2003 
(Definition 1) or based on government classification (Definition 2). 
 
Table S2: Impact of Conflict Intensity Measured by Casualties on Completed Years of Education 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Explained Variable and 
Sample 
Years of 
Education -  
Female 
Years of 
Education -  
Male 
Years of 
Education -  
Female  
10-18 
Years of 
Education -  
Male 10-18 
Years of 
Education -  
Female  
10-18 
Years of 
Education -  
Male 10-18 
Specification Eq. (1R) Eq. (1R) Eq. (2R) Eq. (2R) Eq. (2R) Eq. (2R) 
=1 if 5-9 in 1996 x district 
casualties during 1996-2006 
(𝑇𝑂𝑇𝐶𝑂𝑁𝐹𝑗
𝑡) 
0.6161*** 0.2849 
    
(0.2162) (0.2444) 
    District casualties before 
survey  (𝐶𝑂𝑁𝐹𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑖𝑗
𝑠 )   
0.4379 -0.0141 0.4766** 0.0350 
  
(0.2667) (0.2190) (0.2139) (0.1844) 
=1 if rural 
    
-0.8859*** -0.6072*** 
     
(0.1491) (0.1043) 
=1 if Head has primary 
Education     
0.4221*** 0.4676*** 
    
(0.0810) (0.0699) 
=1 if Head has secondary 
Education     
1.7433*** 1.4665*** 
    
(0.0822) (0.0909) 
=1 if Head has higher 
Education     
2.5281*** 2.1129*** 
    
(0.2092) (0.1730) 
Panel variable District District District District District District 
Included dummies: 
      Year of  Birth Yes Yes No No No No 
Region x Year of Birth Yes Yes No No No No 
DHS 2006 No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Age at Interview No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Region x DHS 2006 No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
DHS 2006 x Age at 
Interview No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Region x Age at Interview No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
DHS 2006 x Region x Age 
at Interview  No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 3823 3055 9595 9267 9584 9255 
No. of Clusters 75 75 69a 69a 69a 69a 
R-Squared 0.0982 0.0434 0.1961 0.3394 0.2882 0.4042 
All specifications are estimated using the panel fixed-effects estimator and include a constant. District casualties are 
expressed per 1000 inhabitants (INSEC 2009, Central Bureau of Statistics 2009). Columns (1) and (2): Sample only 
includes individuals surveyed in the Nepal DHS 2006 and age 5-9 (treatment group) or 16-19 years old (control group) 
at the start of conflict in 1996. Columns (3) to (6): Sample only includes individuals surveyed in Nepal DHS 2001 or 
2006, age 10 to 18 at the time of the survey. aDHS data collection was somewhat affected by the conflict in 2001, and 
so contrary to DHS 2006 four districts were not covered, namely Dolpa, Jajarkot, Rolpa and Rukhum. The small 
districts of Manang and Mustang were not surveyed either, but these districts did not experience any casualty during 
the conflict. Standard errors clustered at the district level are in parentheses. *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table S3. Impact of Conflict Intensity Measured by Casualties on Primary Schooling Completion – 
Alternative Specifications 
 
(1) 
Basic DiD 
Female 
(2) 
Basic DiD 
Male 
(3) 
Alternative 
Control 
Cohort 
Female 
(4) 
Alternative 
Control 
Cohort Male 
(5) 
Log 
Casualties 
Female 
(6) 
Log 
Casualties 
Male 
 Explained Variable Primary Ed. Primary Ed. Primary Ed. Primary Ed. Primary Ed. Primary Ed. 
Specification Eq. (1) Eq. (1) Eq. (1) Eq. (1) Eq. (1) Eq. (1) 
=1 if 5-9 in 1996  
x district casualties during 1996-
2006 
0.0756*** 0.0387*   
  
(0.0184) (0.0217)   
  =1 if 5-9 in 1996  
x district casualties during 1996-
2006, alternative control group 
  
0.0637*** 0.0171 
  
  
(0.0187) (0.0171) 
  =1 if 5-9 in 1996  
x log(district casualties during 
1996-2006) 
    
0.0954*** 
(0.0246) 
0.0521** 
(0.0222) 
  Panel Variable District District District District District District 
Year of Birth dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 3823 3055 4433 3620 3808 3043 
No. of Clusters 75 75 75 75 73 73 
R-Squared 0.0998 0.0249 0.1722 0.0378 0.1028 0.0262 
All specifications are estimated using the panel fixed-effects estimator and include a constant. District casualties are 
expressed per 1000 inhabitants (INSEC 2009, Central Bureau of Statistics 2009). All columns except Columns (3) and 
(4): Sample includes only individuals surveyed in the Nepal DHS 2006 and age 5-9 (treatment group) or 16-19 years 
old (control group) at the start of conflict in 1996. Columns (3) and (4): Sample includes only individuals surveyed in 
the Nepal DHS 2006 and age 5-9 (treatment group) or 18-24 years old (control group) at the start of conflict in 1996. 
The samples in Columns (5) and (6) are slightly smaller compared to Columns (1) and (2) because the natural 
logarithm of conflict casualties is undefined for observations from the small districts of Manang and Mustang, where 
there were no conflict casualties. Standard errors clustered at the district level are in parentheses. *p<0.10, **p<0.05, 
***p<0.01. 
 
 
 
Table S4: Impact of Alternative Conflict Variables on Primary Schooling Completion – Basic Difference-in-Differences Specification 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
School 
Destructions 
Female 
School 
Destructions 
Male 
Maoist 
Abductions 
Female 
Maoist 
Abductions 
Male 
Maoist Control 
Female –
Definition 1 
Maoist Control 
Male –
Definition 1 
Maoist Control 
Female –
Definition 2 
Maoist Control 
Male –  
Definition 2 
Explained Variable Primary Ed. Primary Ed. Primary Ed. Primary Ed. Primary Ed. Primary Ed. Primary Ed. Primary Ed. 
Specification Eq. (1) Eq. (1) Eq. (1) Eq. (1) Eq. (1) Eq. (1) Eq. (1) Eq. (1) 
=1 if 5-9 in 1996 x district 
casualties during 1996-2006 
(𝑇𝑂𝑇𝐶𝑂𝑁𝐹𝑗
𝑡) 
0.0710*** 0.0423* 0.0806*** 0.0364* 
  
  
(0.0219) (0.0238) (0.0186) (0.0218) 
  
  
=1 if 5-9 in 1996 x district 
schools destroyed 2002-2006 
1.3545 -1.2498 
    
  
(4.5298) (2.4198) 
    
  
=1 if 5-9 in 1996 x Maoist 
Abductions during 1996-2006   
-0.0021*** 0.0008 
  
  
  
(0.0007) (0.0013) 
  
  
=1 if 5-9 in 1996 x District 
controlled by Maoist 
(Definition 1) 
    
0.0794 0.1781***   
    
(0.0572) (0.0546)   
=1 if 5-9 in 1996 x District 
controlled by Maoist 
(Definition 2) 
      
0.1036** 0.0641 
      
(0.0477) (0.0475) 
Panel Variable District District District District District District District District 
Year of Birth dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 3823 3055 3823 3055 3823 3055 3823 3055 
No. of Clusters 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 
R-Squared 0.0999 0.0250 0.1010 0.0250 0.0971 0.0282 0.0987 0.0249 
All specifications are estimated using the panel fixed-effects estimator and include a constant. School destructions and abductions by Maoists are expressed per 1000 inhabitants 
(INSEC 2009, Central Bureau of Statistics 2009). Sample only includes individuals surveyed in the Nepal DHS 2006 and age 5-9 (treatment group) or 16-19 years old (control group) 
at the start of conflict in 1996. Definition of district controlled by Maoist based either on matches between People’s Army and government classifications as of 2003 (Definition 1) or 
based on government classification (Definition 2), according to Hattlebak (2007). Standard errors clustered at the district level are in parentheses. *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. 
 
 
 
 
Table S5: Impact of Alternative Conflict Variables on Primary Schooling Attainment - Basic Difference-in-Differences Specification and Alternative Control Cohort 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
School 
Destructions 
Female 
School 
Destructions 
Male 
Maoist 
Abductions 
Female 
Maoist 
Abductions 
Male 
Maoist Control 
Female –
Definition 1 
Maoist Control 
Male –
Definition 1 
Maoist Control 
Female –
Definition 2 
Maoist Control 
Male – 
Definition 2 
Explained Variable Primary Ed. Primary Ed. Primary Ed. Primary Ed. Primary Ed. Primary Ed. Primary Ed. Primary Ed. 
Specification Eq. (1) Eq. (1) Eq. (1) Eq. (1) Eq. (1) Eq. (1) Eq. (1) Eq. (1) 
=1 if 5-9 in 1996 x district 
casualties during 1996-2006 
(𝑇𝑂𝑇𝐶𝑂𝑁𝐹𝑗
𝑡) 
0.0482** 0.0291 0.0668*** 0.0167 
  
  
(0.0212) (0.0213) (0.0190) (0.0172) 
  
  
=1 if 5-9 in 1996 x district 
schools destroyed 2002-2006 
3.8806 -3.0837 
    
  
(3.3306) (2.6280) 
    
  
=1 if 5-9 in 1996 x Maoist 
Abductions during 1996-2006   
-0.0013** 0.0001 
  
  
  
(0.0006) (0.0007) 
  
  
=1 if 5-9 in 1996 x District 
controlled by Maoist 
(Definition 1) 
    
0.0997* 0.1101**   
    
(0.0596) (0.0491)   
=1 if 5-9 in 1996 x District 
controlled by Maoist 
(Definition 2) 
      
0.1348*** 0.0479 
      
(0.0463) (0.0425) 
Panel Variable District District District District District District District District 
Year of Birth dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 4433 3620 4433 3620 4433 3620 4433 3620 
No. of Clusters 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 
R-Squared 0.1729 0.0384 0.1726 0.0378 0.1706 0.0394 0.1736 0.0382 
All specifications are estimated using the panel fixed-effects estimator and include a constant. School destructions and abductions by Maoists are expressed per 1000 inhabitants 
(INSEC 2009, Central Bureau of Statistics 2009). Sample only includes individuals surveyed in the Nepal DHS 2006 and age 5-9 (treatment group) or 18-24 years old (control group) 
at the start of conflict in 1996. Definition of district controlled by Maoist based either on matches between People’s Army and government classifications as of 2003 (Definition 1) or 
based on government classification (Definition 2), according to Hattlebak (2007). Standard errors clustered at the district level are in parentheses. *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. 
 
 
 
Table S6: Impact of Conflict Intensity on Completed Years of Education, 5-14 year-olds – Basic 
Specification 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Explained Variable and Sample 
Years of 
Education 
Female 5-14 
Years of 
Education  
Male 5-14 
Years of 
Education 
Female 5-14 – 
Mother here 
since 1996 
Years of 
Education  
Male 5-14 – 
Mother here 
since 1996 
Specification Eq. (2) Eq. (2) Eq. (2) Eq. (2) 
District casualties before survey  
(𝐶𝑂𝑁𝐹𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑖𝑗
𝑠 ) 0.2623*** 0.2565*** 0.2059** 0.1920** 
 
(0.0882) (0.0947) (0.0914) (0.0886) 
=1 if Rural -0.3728*** -0.1617** -0.4514*** -0.1757** 
 
(0.0827) (0.0661) (0.0939) (0.0705) 
=1 if Head has primary education 0.2246*** 0.2311*** 0.2082*** 0.2435*** 
 
(0.0438) (0.0364) (0.0459) (0.0379) 
=1 if Head has secondary education 0.8231*** 0.7134*** 0.8650*** 0.7365*** 
 
(0.0437) (0.0391) (0.0513) (0.0389) 
=1 if Head has higher education 1.1095*** 1.0926*** 1.3758*** 1.2198*** 
 
(0.1047) (0.0847) (0.1132) (0.1110) 
Panel variable District District District District 
Included dummies: 
    DHS 2006 Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Age at Interview Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 11793 12116 9772 9959 
No. of Clusters 69a 69a 69a 69a 
R-Squared 0.4858 0.5971 0.4722 0.5890 
All specifications are estimated using the panel fixed-effects estimator and include a constant. District casualties are 
expressed per 1000 inhabitants  (INSEC 2009, Central Bureau of Statistics 2009). Sample only includes individuals 
surveyed in the Nepal DHS 2001 and 2006 and age 5-14 at the time of the survey. In Columns (3) and (4), the 2006 
sample is restricted to individuals whose mothers were interviewed individually and whose mothers report already 
living in their current place of residence as of 1996. The same exclusion could not be implemented for the 2001 DHS 
as individuals listed in the household roster cannot be matched to their mothers. a DHS data collection was somewhat 
affected by the conflict in 2001, and so contrary to DHS 2006 four districts were not covered, namely Dolpa, Jajarkot, 
Rolpa and Rukhum. The small districts of Manang and Mustang were not surveyed either, but these districts did not 
experience any casualty during the conflict. Standard errors clustered at the district level are in parentheses. *p<0.10, 
**p<0.05, ***p<0.01. 
 
 
 
 
Appendix Figures 
 
Figure S1 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on INSEC (2009). 
 
Figure S2 
 
Source: Deaths and abductions are taken from INSEC (2009). District population figures are based on the 1991 population 
census (Central Bureau of Statistics 2009). Taplejung, which had 129.3 abductions per 1000 inhabitants, is excluded for 
readability. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure S3a 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on the Nepal Demographic and Health Survey 2006, casualties recorded in INSEC (2009) 
and district population figures from the 1991 population census (Central Bureau of Statistics, 2009). Conflict-intensity terciles 
are based on the district distribution of conflict-related deaths per 1000 inhabitants from 1996 to 2006. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure S3b 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on the Nepal Demographic and Health Survey 2006, casualties recorded in INSEC (2009) 
and district population figures from the 1991 population census (Central Bureau of Statistics 2009). Conflict-intensity terciles 
are based on the district distribution of conflict-related deaths per 1000 inhabitants from 1996 to 2006. 
 
 
 
